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ABSTRACT 
This paper describes two methods, Technology Roadmapping and Project Risk Assessment, 
which were used to identify and manage the technical risks relating to the treatment of Sodium 
Bearing Waste at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory.  The waste 
treatment technology under consideration was Direct Vitrification.   The primary objective of the 
Technology Roadmap is to identify technical data uncertainties for the technologies involved and 
to prioritize the testing or development studies to fill the data gaps.  Similarly, project 
management’s objectives for a multi-million dollar construction project include managing all the 
key risks in accordance to DOE O 413.3 – Program and Project Management for the Acquisition 
of Capital Assets.   In the early stages, the Project Risk Assessment is based upon a qualitative 
analysis for each risk’s probability and consequence.  In order to clearly prioritize the work to 
resolve the technical issues identified in the Technology Roadmap, the issues must be cross-
referenced to the project’s Risk Assessment.  This will enable the project to get the best value for 
the cost to mitigate the risks.  
INTRODUCTION
This paper discusses the tools used to identify, manage and mitigate the risks associated with 
treating Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC) sodium bearing waste 
(SBW) using Direct Vitrification technology.   These tools include: 
• Technology Roadmapping, 
• Technical Baseline Database (TBDB), and a 
• Risk Management Plan (RMP).   
Background 
From 1953 to 1992, Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) was reprocessed at the Idaho Chemical 
Processing Plant, which is now known as the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center 
(INTEC). The SNF was shipped to INTEC from various reactors located throughout the world 
and temporarily stored while some of it was chemically reprocessed to recover uranium, 
lanthanum, neptunium, and krypton. SNF reprocessing produced mixed liquid waste, which was 
concentrated and stored in a tank farm.
The liquid waste types that were stored in INTEC’s tank farm include high-level waste (HLW) 
and sodium bearing waste (SBW). The HLW was generated as a direct result of reprocessing 
SNF while the SBW was generated from incidental activities, such as facility and equipment 
decontamination work associated with INTEC’s operation. The label “Sodium Bearing Waste” 
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relates to the high sodium concentration resulting from activities that extensively used sodium-
based chemicals such as sodium hydroxide and sodium carbonate.
In 1992, spent fuel reprocessing was concluded and the SNF reprocessing facilities at INTEC 
were shutdown. Although HLW ceased to be generated, SBW generation continued as a result of 
SNF storage, waste management, off-gas cleanup, and decontamination and decommissioning of 
unused facilities. Currently, SBW evaporation continues in order to reduce the liquid volume and 
the concentrated SBW is stored in the tank farm.
There are two regulatory mandates for treating INTEC’s radioactive wastes.  In April 1992 a 
Consent Order to a Notice of Noncompliance between the EPA and the State of Idaho required 
that DOE “cease use” of five of the eleven tanks located in the tank farm by March 31, 2009.
The Consent Order was modified in 1998 to move the “cease use” date of these tanks up to June 
30, 2003.  On October 16, 1995 a Settlement Agreement between the DOE, the U.S. Navy and 
the State of Idaho was made.  The Settlement Agreement primary requirements include: 
• SBW treatment and cease use of the tank farm storage tanks by December 31, 2012; and
• HLW treatment so it is ready for disposal and made road-ready for shipment out of Idaho 
by December 31, 2035. 
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ROADMAPS 
There are several types of technology roadmaps used by industry and government sectors. (1) In 
general, technology roadmapping is a disciplined, needs-driven, consensus-building process to 
identify, select and develop technology alternatives to satisfy a need.
In the draft guidance document entitled  “Applying Science and Technology Roadmapping in 
Environmental Management (Draft B)”, EM-50 defines the purpose for a science and technology 
roadmap. (2)  “Within EM, science and technology roadmapping includes planning for scientific 
research and engineering development, with the end goal of cleanup and stewardship mission
application.”  Roadmapping identifies “what, when and why” the activities must be done but 
does not identify “who, where or how” they will be accomplished.  “Project-level roadmapping
identifies and mitigates the technical risk in the project baseline.  The goal is to identify and 
schedule R&D activities so that all proofs-of-concept are completed by the end of the pre-
conceptual design phase, and sufficient engineering knowledge on process parameters and 
scaling is available to complete conceptual design.  Thus, the roadmapping process synchronizes 
facility engineering with R&D.” 
Early in fiscal year (FY) 2000, the Department of Energy (DOE-ID) and Idaho National 
Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) identified the need to develop a roadmap
for technologies applicable to the treatment and disposal of the SBW.
The need for a science and technology roadmap was driven by two major factors. First, the 
National Environmental Policy Act’s (NEPA) environmental impact statement (EIS) process for 
technology selection for SBW treatment has yet to be completed.  Realizing a potential schedule 
conflict for a line-item construction project versus the Settlement Agreement’s deadline, it was 
decided to develop a technology roadmap for the three most probable SBW treatment scenarios.
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The other integral driver for the development of the roadmap is the technical complexity of each 
treatment scenario.  Each treatment option has several uncertainties associated with its 
application to the treatment of SBW.  Since time is of the essence and funds are in limited
supply, the roadmapping process identified the technical uncertainties for these three possible 
treatment methods, so then when the EIS Record of Decision (ROD) is issued, the INEEL will be 
prepared to carry out the activities required to implement that decision.
The three SBW treatment technologies that were roadmapped include Cesium Ion Exchange 
(CsIX), then the baseline treatment option, Solvent Extraction (SX), and Direct Vitrification. (3) 
In FY-2001, DOE-ID, using a project management decision process, changed the baseline SBW
treatment option to Direct Vitrification subject to the results of the EIS-ROD.  This increased the 
focus on the Direct Vitrification portion of the roadmap, while the development of the 
uncertainties for the other options was put on hold. 
Developing the Direct Vitrification Roadmap 
Developing the Direct Vitrification technology roadmap involved four phases or steps.  The first 
was the initiation step that ensured the roadmap work scope was adequately defined.  Agreement
was reached on the roadmap’s scope, leadership, participants and deliverables.  The second 
phase consisted of using a structured approach for identifying the technical issues for treating 
SBW by Direct Vitrification. This phase also included the generation of a documented
consensus on the technical needs for Direct Vitrification.  To this end, scientific and engineering 
representatives from both the INEEL and other DOE sites, including experts from Savannah
River Site and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, discussed uncertainties relating to process 
and equipment failure, safety, and engineering design.
The team consisted of members with a variety of expertise and experience.  These individuals 
were skilled in the design and operation of the technologies relating to Direct Vitrification in a 
highly radioactive environment.  The technologies of interest include SBW feed preparation, 
joule-heated melter design, and off-gas/secondary waste treatment systems. After identifying and 
compiling the issues, the technologists and engineers then assessed the existing knowledge base 
for each uncertainty.
The third phase included developing a plan to gather information necessary to resolve the 
identified uncertainties. Finally, the roadmap report was reviewed, released and implemented.
The roadmap was used to develop R&D budgets and prioritize the work to support the pre-
conceptual design of the Direct Vitrification process.
Direct Vitrification Technical Issues 
The roadmap team developed a list of approximately 100 issues that were categorized into one of 
six separate technology areas. These areas included: waste feed and delivery; waste/glass/frit 
formulations; melter; off-gas system; secondary waste; and integration.  Samples of the issues 
are presented in Table I.
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Table I. Selected Technical Uncertainties for Direct Vitrification of SBW 
Issue Category Issue Title Full Description
Feed Prep and Delivery
Feed Mixing & 
Delivery
Slurry Characteristics
(homogenous mixing,
pump performance)
Undissolved solids, frit (glass formers):
must be pumpable and homogeneous
Formulations
Glass Formulation 
and Certification
Glass
qualification/certification
Perform testing and qualification activities 
to support waste product characterization 
and qualification requirements
Melter
Feed Mixing & 
Delivery
Selection of frit or glass 
forming compounds (GFC) 
additives to waste slurry
Evaluate the impact of frit vs. GFC on the 
blended feed rheology and melt rate, 
selection between GFC, time effects on 
rheology from digestion 
Melter Type 
Evaluation
Melter Type 1) Can we make Glass?  2) Melter 
operability; a. Throughput, b. 
Lifetime/durability, c. Flexibility – 
wet/dry, batch-vs. -continuous, d. 
Performance, e. D&D, f. Ancillary
equipment
Off-Gas System
Maximum Air
Pollution Control 
Technology
(MACT)
MACT compliance Depending on the upstream process, 
MACT compliance may or may not be 
required.  Stakeholders may insist that 
MACT emission limits be met.
Mercury Adsorption 
Bed
Design/Operation
for Target D/F
Mercury removal 
technologies
Carbon adsorption seems to be the least-
risk alternative for removing mercury.
However, if granulated activated carbon 
(GAC) doesn’t look capable of removing
all species of mercury present, other 
technologies must be vigorously pursued. 
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Secondary Waste 
Scrub Solution 
Treatment Design & 
Verification
IX media selectivity based
on off-gas and scrubber 
characterization
Select ion exchange media for removal of 
cesium from scrubber blowdown. 
Integration
Feed Mixing & 
Delivery
Simulants Develop representative SBW simulant for 
testing
The uncertainties were then categorized as high, medium, or low in order to prioritize the work 
envisioned necessary to resolve each uncertainty.  The primary criterion used to classify each 
concern was based upon the available information for each topic.  If an uncertainty had no 
known data to support an engineering solution, it was assigned a “high” uncertainty. This rating 
should not be confused with the level of difficulty for resolving the problem.  It only means that 
there were no known data to validate a possible solution.  If there were data supporting a solution 
to the problem but with limited evidence of implementation, it was listed as a “medium”
uncertainty.  Identified issues that had evidence of an engineering solution(s) and examples of 
DOE complex-wide successful implementations were classified as “low”.  Often, but not always, 
this rating also corresponded to the consequence of the uncertainty proving to have negative 
impact.  Table II lists some of the issues that were categorized in the aforementioned manner.
To better understand these classifications, consider a fictitious example of having an uncertainty 
relative to off-gas emissions. If there is some compound that has to be managed below a 
threshold level, and it is unclear whether or not the process will emit the compound above or 
below that level, there is some uncertainty.  The cost of that uncertainty is proportional to either 
the ramification of allowing that emission to exceed the threshold (potential shut-down of the 
operation), or the cost associated with installing a device that would reduce the emission level.  If
there were no data on a device that could reduce the emission level, then this would be a “high” 
level uncertainty.  If there were a device that could reduce the emission level, but had only been 
used once on a different type of off-gas, this would be a “medium” uncertainty.  If the device had 
been used many times successfully on different types of off-gas, it would be a “low” uncertainty. 
Table II. Samples of Categorized Uncertainties for Direct Vitrification of SBW
Unit Operation Mode of Failure Consequence
H, M, 
L Explanation
DeNoxidizer(off-gas
treatment)
Causes rise in Hg 
oxidation state, 
Hg goes through 
GAC beds, 
exceeds emission
Emissions limit
exceeded;
Operating permit
denied. H
Don't know 
oxidation state 
5
WM’02 Conference, February 24-28, 2002, Tucson, AZ
Unit Operation Mode of Failure Consequence
H, M, 
L Explanation
limit. Interface 
incompatibility.
Granular Activated Carbon 
Hg not in proper 
oxidation state, 
carbon beds do 
not remove it.
Emissions limit
exceeded;
Operating permit
denied. H
Don't know Hg 
speciation for sure, 
no data 
Vitrification
Unknown feed
composition, off-
gas composition
unknown then, so 
off-gas treatment
needs unknown. 
Can't design 
proper off gas 
treatment H
Limited data
available
SBW Feed 
Characterization
Liquid chemical
composition not 
known.
Simulated testing
does not 
characterize
interferences.
Required DFs, 
other ops. 
constraints, and 
WAC not met. M
Have some data on 
problem causing 
materials, can 
engineer in that 
envelope
Vitrification
“Uncontrolled
pours” result in 
excessive and
continuous
spilling. M
SRS is dealing 
with it 
Vitrification Electrode failure
Melter failure
(burn up) M
Don't have enough 
data to be low, but 
too much to be 
high
SBW Feed 
Characterization
Liquid
radionuclide
composition not 
known.
Simulated testing
does not bracket 
the requirements
for waste
processing. WAC not met. L
A combination of 
test data and
knowledge of tank 
input lowers this 
uncertainty.
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Unit Operation Mode of Failure Consequence
H, M, 
L Explanation
Chemical Makeup 
Technology for 
uniform mixing
of vit. feed solids 
not developed.
Glass does not
meet
performance
specs of Yucca. L
SRS has 
engineered this 
TECHNICAL BASELINE DATABASE
During FY-2001, a Technical Baseline Database (TBDB) was developed as a management tool 
for tracking the status of the design basis for the Direct Vitrification process.  The central data 
entity in the TBDB is the design basis element (DBE).  The DBEs are the process requirements
and assumptions needed to generate an overall mass balance for the process.  Each DBE is a 
statement of what is required (i.e. process functional requirement), or what is currently known or 
assumed regarding a specific element or aspect of the process flowsheet.  The TBDB also 
contains for each DBE its current technical basis and a breakdown of development tasks that 
should be completed to validate it.  In aggregate the TBDB therefore constitutes a description of 
the technical baseline for the process as well as a blueprint for its validation.
The TBDB was developed in response to a need for a managed technical baseline.  Many of the 
assumptions used to develop  process mass balances (a major part of the technical baseline) for 
the Direct Vitrification process were invalidated.  This caused disagreement among the project 
team concerning the baseline’s legitimacy.  Therefore, the project team decided that the mass
balance assumptions should  be coupled to the uncertainties, which had been identified in the 
technology roadmap and made accessible to all program members.  This was accomplished using 
an Access £ database stored on a server that everyone assigned to the project could view from his 
or her desktop computer station.  In the interest of configuration management only one 
individual can update the DBEs as the validation information becomes available and is 
reviewed/approved by the TBDB change control board.
RISK MANAGEMENT PLAN 
Upon formalizing the Direct Vitrification treatment option for SBW, the Project Manager 
initialized the risk management strategy process.  In accordance to DOE Order 413.3, a Risk 
Management Plan (RMP) that defines the scope, responsibilities, and methodology for 
identifying, evaluating impacts of, and managing assessable risks was made. (4) This DOE order, 
issued in October 2000, recognizes that one of the major reasons for a project’s failure is the lack 
of appropriate risk management.
The purpose of the RMP is to ensure that the Direct Vitrification project incorporates 
appropriate, efficient, and cost-effective measures to mitigate unacceptable project-related risks.
As such, it provides the necessary project planning to ensure that all the risks associated with the 
project are identified, analyzed, and determined to be  eliminated, mitigated, or manageable.
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The RMP focused on all identifiable risks that could jeopardize the successful SBW treatment
using Direct Vitrification technology.  These include programmatic (non-technical), technical, 
cost, and schedule risks.
Figure 1 below shows the top-level risk management functional hierarchy.  The timeline shown 
in Figure 2 depicts the conceptual timing of risk management activities over the course of the 
project.  In the figure these activities are shown relative to the CD milestones described in DOE 
O 413.3. 
The RMP generally excludes external programmatic risks since they are outside of the project’s 
ability to control or manage.  However, these risks may, at the project manager’s discretion, be 
tracked in the Risk Item Log to ensure that appropriate interface controls are established with the 
affected external organizations.
There is considerable overlap in scope between the technology roadmap and the project’s
technical risk assessment results that were developed in accordance to the RMP.  However, the
project’s risk assessment is more inclusive of all the technical facets for the project.  For
example, the RMP includes the identified risks for the infrastructure envisioned for executing the 
Direct Vitrification project, whereas the technology roadmap focuses on the treatment process 
per se.
Figure 1.  Project Risk Management Functions 
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Figure 2.  Risk Management Process Timeline (Conceptual Based on Milestones) 
The RMP is considered to be the governing document for managing the project risks and 
ultimately the Direct Vitrification technology roadmap uncertainties will be integrated into the
project’s risk management process for reasons discussed later in this report.
Strategy Summary
The project strategy for managing risk has five underlying elements.  These are; focus, maturity,
process, resource utilization, and graded approach.  The paragraphs below describe these 
elements and serve as a guide for the plan’s evolution throughout the project life cycle.
Focus
The RMP recognizes that the type and nature of project risk will change as the project moves 
from phase to phase in its life cycle.  Risks tend to be programmatic and system-oriented in early
project phases and become more detailed and specific (i.e., technical) as the project progresses.
Thus, by creating risk management processes that can handle a broad range of risk items and by 
considering the plan a controlled but living document, the project will be able to accommodate
these changes in risk focus.  Revisions to the plan are expected, but may not be required, at each 
CD milestone.
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Process Strategy
The risk management process strategy is to use a structured, stepwise methodology, which 
includes the following major elements:
• Risk management planning (including self-assessment and continuous improvement)
• Risk identification 
• Risk analysis and quantification (probability and consequence) 
• Risk handling and response (e.g., avoidance, reduction, mitigation, or acceptance) 
• Risk impact determination for the selected handling and response implementation and 
any residual risk impacts
• Risk tracking and reporting (including periodic reevaluation of “low” risks and risk event 
trigger monitoring).
Resource Utilization Strategy
The risk management strategy for resource utilization focuses on the use of multidisciplinary risk 
management team members to perform risk analyses and response planning activities and 
dedicated project support personnel for administration of the risk management process.  The 
team members will ideally consist of a small number of permanent, or core, members with 
additional members (e.g., subject matter experts) brought in on an as needed basis 
Graded Approach Strategy
A graded approach has been and will continue to be applied to risk management activities 
relative to specific risk items based on their assigned risk level.  In other words, the level of 
detail and degree of management applied to a risk item will increase as the assessed risk level 
increases.
Risk Item Analysis and Quantification 
Due to the preliminary nature of the project, all the risks identified thus far have been analyzed 
using a qualitative assessment.  This method of risk analysis involves using qualitative scales to 
determine the probability of occurrence of a risk and its consequences.  The qualitative 
assessment method is typically preferred earlier in the project life cycle and for risk items that 
are broad, vague, non-technical, or not otherwise suitable for quantitative or analytical 
assessment methods.  The following steps were used to analyze the risks. 
1. Each risk item was carefully described to avoid duplication and minimize issue overlap.
2. A multidisciplinary team analyzed each risk.
3. The qualitative probability of occurrence (PO) rating for each risk item was assigned 
using the criteria in Table III.  The rating was based upon the risk condition prior to 
10
WM’02 Conference, February 24-28, 2002, Tucson, AZ
implementation of any risk handling strategy.  A team consensus was required to assign 
the rating.
4. The qualitative consequence of occurrence (CO) rating for each risk item was assigned 
using the criteria in Table IV.  The rating was based upon the risk condition prior to 
implementation of any risk handling strategy. A team consensus was required to assign 
the rating.
5. The justification or rationale for the each risk rating and whether it applies for the 
duration of all project phases or for the activity being assessed was also documented.
Significant dissenting opinions by the team members(s) were also recorded.
6. Based upon the probability and consequence a risk level was assigned to each risk item. 
The risk level is read directly from the Risk Level Matrix (Table V). 
Table III.  Risk Probabilities
Qualitative
Probability
Occurrence
(Po)
Criteria
Very Unlikely
Will not likely occur anytime in the life cycle of the facilities;
or the estimated recurrence interval exceeds 1,000 years; or
the PO is less than or equal to 10%. 
Unlikely
Will not likely occur in the life cycle of the project or its
facilities; or the estimated recurrence interval is between 100 
to 1,000 years; or the PO is greater than 10% but less than or 
equal to 40%.
Likely
Will likely occur sometime during the life cycle of the project 
or its facilities; or the estimated recurrence interval is between 
10 to 100 years; or the PO is greater than 40% but less than or 
equal to 80%.
Very Likely
Will likely occur sometime during the life cycle of the project; 
or the estimated recurrence interval is less than 10 years; or
the PO is greater than 80%. 
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Table IV.  Risk Consequences
Consequence
of Occurrence
(CO)
Qualitative
Criteriaa
Negligible
(N)
Minimal or no consequences; unimportant.
Cost estimates minimally exceeded (i.e., TPC increases up to $5M).
Negligible impact on program. Slight potential for schedule change; 
compensated by available schedule float.  No milestone changes 
required.  Typically, less than 1 month.
Marginal
(M)
Small reduction in technical performance and/or quality.
Moderate threat to facility mission, environment, or people; may
require minor facility redesign or repair, minor environmental 
remediation, or first aid/minor medical intervention. 
Minor slip in schedule with some potential adjustment to milestones
required.  Typically, between 1 and 6 months.
Significant
(S)
Significant degradation in technical performance and/or quality.
Significant threat to facility mission, environment, or people; 
requires some facility redesign or repair, significant environmental
remediation, or causes injury requiring medical treatment.
Cost estimates significantly exceed budget (i.e., TPC increases
between  $25M to $125M)
Significant slip in schedule with resulting milestone changes that 
may affect facility mission.  Typically, between 6 and 12 months.
Critical
(C)
Technical and/or quality goals of project cannot be achieved. 
Serious threat to facility mission, environment, or people; possibly
completing only portions of the mission or requiring major facility
redesign or rebuilding, extensive environmental remediation, or 
intensive medical care for life-threatening injury. 
Cost estimates seriously exceed budget (i.e., TPC increases between
$125M to $250M)
Excessive schedule slip unacceptably affecting overall mission of 
facility and endangering the Settlement Agreement Enforceable 
Milestones.  Typically, between 12 and 18 months.
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Consequence
of Occurrence
(CO)
Criteriaa
Qualitative
Crisis
(Cr)
Project cannot be completed.
Catastrophic threat to facility mission, long-term environmental
abandonment, and death. 
Cost estimates for TPC increase by more than $250M. 
Schedule slip invalidates overall facility mission through non-
attainment of Settlement Agreement Enforceable Milestones.
Typically, greater than 18 months.
a. Any one or more of the criteria in five level consequences may apply to a single risk.
The consequence level for the risk being evaluated must be based upon the highest level 
for which a criterion applies.
Table V.  Risk Level Matrix
Very
Likely Moderate Moderate High High High
Likely Low Moderate High High High
Unlikely Low Low Moderate Moderate High
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 o
f 
O
cc
ur
re
nc
e 
(P
O
)
Very
Unlikely Low Low Low Low Moderate
Negligible Marginal Signifi-cant Critical
Crisis
Consequence of Occurrence (CO)
Technical Risk Assessment Results
Table VI is a breakdown of the technical risk assessment for the Direct Vitrification project.
The risk identification and assessment process was as far as the risk management team was able 
to go during FY-2001.  The next stage in the risk management process will be to formally
identify and assess the project’s programmatic risks, develop risk handling strategies and ensure 
that the technology roadmap uncertainties are covered by the project’s the risk management
activities.
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Table VI. Technical Risk Assessment Rating Summary 
Facility Total Risk
Issues
High Moderate Low Outside
Project
Control
Unrated
SBW Storage 
Tank Farm
18 6 5 7
SBW Direct 
Vitrification
Treatment
56 11 17 23 5
SBW Waste 
Product
Storage
17 4 3 6 4
Total 91 21 25 36 4 5
SUMMARY
Because the Direct Vitrification technology roadmap was developed before the Direct 
Vitrification project was formalized, there is a disconnect between the roadmap and the project’s 
risk assessment.  Specifically, in late summer of 2000, a team of INEEL scientists and engineers, 
with additional support of the Tank Focus Area individuals developed the technology roadmap
for the vitrification of SBW.  Evolving from this process was the Technology Baseline Data Base 
(TBDB).  The database was made to tabulate the assumptions, uncertainties, requirements, and 
development needs for the vitrification process. The basis for ranking or prioritizing the work to 
resolve the technical issues was available technology information and potential uncertainty 
consequence.
In 2001, INEEL’s Engineering group developed the technical risk list for the project.  These 
risks were ranked based upon probability of occurrence and potential consequences to the 
program.  This activity created a different list and risk perspective than the roadmap.
Early in FY-2002, cross-referencing tables were developed as a first step in transitioning the 
risks from the technology roadmap to the project’s risk management process.  These tables were 
necessary to establish if there are any design basis elements (DBEs) that are outside the 
identified technical risks (i.e. that can not be associated with any risk).  It was determined that all 
150 DBEs can be categorized into one or more of the 56 technical risks identified during the 
project’ risk assessment.   Since the TBDBs have been given a priority number of 1,4,7 or 10, (1 
is high priority, 7 is a low priority, and 10 is unprioritized) these tables are useful to plan future 
work based on important data needs.  Data needs could be rated as follows: a high priority DBE 
mapped to a risk category rated “high” would merit more attention than a DBE mapped to a low
risk.
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Prior to project initiation, the focus for technology roadmaps is risk elimination around proof of 
technical viability.  At a point in time when the project can be initiated (i.e., believed to be viable 
by management), the remaining risks in the roadmap need to be integrated with the project risk 
assessment and mitigation plans.  For the INEEL Direct Vitrification project, engineering was 
responsible for performing the risk assessment whereas principally technologists generated the 
technology roadmap.  This diversity produced different opinions regarding work priorities to 
resolve the risks and uncertainties.  Therefore, the technology roadmap needs to be integrated 
into the project’s risk assessment in order to prioritize risk mitigation efforts.  This will enable 
the project to get the best value for the cost to mitigate the risks.
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